Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain's Man in Southern Iraq Review

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Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain's Man in Southern Iraq ReviewThis book can usefully be read in conjunction with Rory Stewart's "Prince of the Marshes" for a view of after-invasion events in Southern Iraq, where the British were responsible. Hilary Synnott, the author of this book, was sent to Basra in 2004 to try to create some sort of structure out of the chaos of the civilian reconstruction efforts. His comments are instructive and, unless one lives in a cave, further supports the observation that the United States was clueless in its studied refusal to strongly think about the country's after-war strategy.
Synnott judges the CPA, run by Paul Bremer, as a flawed vehicle for directing reconstruction of Iraq. Late in this book, he observes (Page 246): "With the benefit of hindsight, it may be judged that much of the Coalition's, and hence the CPA's, considerable effort to introduce a lasting and durable political system in Iraq was wasted." Indeed. The Coalition (a term that I think disingenuous, but that's an issue for another day) was a dismal failure. The situation in Iraq only began to improve after an increase in American military force (the Surge) and an increased activism if the Iraqi government. It reminds me of T. E. Lawrence's statement in 1917: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them." American leaders might better have attended to Lawrence of Arabia's views than allowing Bremer to become a viceroy.
As Synnott notes, the entire CPA process broke down. Cashiering technocrats who knew how to keep the Iraqi machinery of government and service delivery going and dismissing the army--creating a pool of dissatisfied Iraqis--can only be described as foolhardy. There were too few resources in the Basra region (comprising four provinces) to really address key issues. Bremer dictated a Baghdad-centric approach to reconstruction, leaving the rest of the country to its own devices.
Synnott actually believes that good was done, certainly in the Basra area. He also realizes that whatever was done was done without adequate support. His concluding few lines are poignant indeed (Page 262): "But the most lasting recollections are positive ones and reflect the stimulus and satisfaction of working closely with highly motivated people, from Iraq and many other countries, including my own, who sincerely wanted to do the best they could in a task which, whatever its appalling and misguided genesis, they felt to be worthwhile."
In the course of the book, Synnott discusses such central issues as the facts on the ground, how he fought to upgrade unbelievably poor facilities, the military-civilian tensions (which were worked out over time), the continuing political dance with local Iraqi leaders, the wretched planning process developed by the CPA, and so on. There are a series of very helpful appendices to provide context, such as a description of the role and purpose of the CPA effort in the South, the CPA vision statement, the CPA organizational chart.
This is a book providing context "on the ground" in the southern part of Iraq in the period of time immediately following the invasion and during the CPA's effort at hegemony. As such, it provides a sense of the inadequate planning, the almost naive assumptions of the invasion, and the heroic work of those in the Coalition trying to retrieve success from the problems caused by the ill thought out after action from the invasion.
All in all, a useful volume to get a sense of the times described by Synnott.
Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain's Man in Southern Iraq OverviewThis is the story of Sir Hilary Synnott's time as Britain's most senior representative in Southern Iraq, from 2003 to 2004, trying to keep the region together as the rest of the country descended in to murderous violence. By turns wryly comic, revealing and heart-breaking, it offers a never seen before glimpse in to the high politics of the occupation. Shuttling between the gilded palaces of the Green Zone and the Coalition HQ in Basra, Synnott had todeal withhis American counterpart Paul Bremer's brash indifference to what was going on in the South, the fickleness of his London masters, who could never make up their minds, and the brutal political realities of a country under occupation. Bearing witness for first time to the chaotic fashion in which the coalition was run and the disastrous impact of its policies, Synnott's unique insider account is the most important primary source yet on how Southern Iraq spun out of control.It is also an entertaining and witty portrait of the absurdities of life inside the occupying coalition.

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